NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

THESIS

GOVERNMENT CAN MOUNT EFFECTIVE
COUNTER-INSURGENCY PROGRAMS
AGAINST MARXIST ORIENTED REVOLUTIONS

by

Robert Arthur Hendricks

September 1983

Thesis Advisor: S. Jurika

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

T215197

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE *(When Data Entered)*

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO.	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE *(and Subtitle)* Government Can Mount Effective Counter-Insurgency Programs Against Marxist Oriented Revolutions		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED Master's Thesis September 1983 6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
7. AUTHOR(s) Robert Arthur Hendricks		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943		12. REPORT DATE September 1983 13. NUMBER OF PAGES 75
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS*(if different from Controlling Office)*		15. SECURITY CLASS. *(of this report)* UNCLASSIFIED 15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE

16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT *(of this Report)*

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT *(of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)*

18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

19. KEY WORDS *(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)*

Marxist-Leninist Revolution
Marxist Oriented Revolution
Marxist Revolution
Illegitimate Government
Lenin
Mao-Tse Tung

20. ABSTRACT *(Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number)*

Governments can effectively combat Marxist oriented revolutionary movements. The facade of legitimacy emerges as the most important variable in conducting a counter-insurgency campaign. Highly developed organizational structure supported by viable lines of transportation and communication enhance both the legitimacy of a government and also its capability to deter internal aggression by opposition forces.

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473 EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE
S/N 0102-LF-014-6601

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE *(When Data Entered)*

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited

Government Can Mount Effective Counter-Insurgency Programs Against Marxist Oriented Revolutions

by

Robert Arthur Hendricks
Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Tennessee Technological University, 1975

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
September 1983

ABSTRACT

Governments can effectively combat Marxist oriented revolutionary movements. The facade of legitimacy emerges as the most important variable in conducting a counter-insurgency campaign. Highly developed organizational structure supported by viable lines of transportation and communication enhance both the legitimacy of a government and also its capability to deter internal aggression by opposition forces.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION ---------- 6

ENDNOTES ---------- 9

II. REVOLUTIONS AND TYRANNY ---------- 10

ENDNOTES ---------- 16

III. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS ---------- 17

ENDNOTES ---------- 25

IV. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE REVOLUTION ---------- 26

A. THE BODY (ENVIRONMENT) ---------- 28

B. THE HEAD (LEADERS) ---------- 40

C. THE CIRCULATION (THE GEOGRAPHY) ---------- 42

D. THE TRANSFUSION (EXTERNAL SUPPORT) ---------- 47

E. THE ANTIBODIES (THE ARMY) ---------- 48

F. THE DNA (THE STRUCTURE) ---------- 50

G. THE SHOCK TREATMENT (GUERRILLA WARFARE AND TERRORISM) ---------- 51

ENDNOTES ---------- 54

V. THE DEFENSE ---------- 57

A. THE FOUNDATION ---------- 57

1. Organization ---------- 57

2. Transportation ---------- 58

3. Communication ---------- 58

4. Visibility ---------- 59

5. Special Police and Intelligence Forces ---------- 60

6. The News Media ---------- 60

B. THE WAR ---------- 61

1. Terrorism ---------- 61

2. Guerrilla Warfare ---------- 62

3. External Support ---------- 63

4. Elimination of Opposition ---------- 63

5. Shock Tactics ---------- 64

6. The Marxist Leadership ---------- 65

7. Propaganda ---------- 65

8. Discipline of the Troops ---------- 66

9. Reforms ---------- 67

ENDNOTES ---------- 68

VI. CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY ---------- 69

BIBLIOGRAPHY ---------- 72

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST ---------- 75

I. INTRODUCTION

This thesis explores ways in which a government can capitalize on the mistakes or intrinsic weaknesses of a Marxist based revolution. To accept as inevitable the capitulation of a government to a revolutionary movement denies the very foundations of modern civilization. If we accept that governments have a right, even a duty, to survive then we must aggressively devise ways by which that government can defend itself against internal aggressions. From a historical perspective, revolutions are as old as civilization itself. The spectacle of the first unpopular government in the dawn of history sowed the seeds of its revolutionary destruction that followed. This thesis contends that by studying historical revolutionary movements, specifically Marxist-Leninist revolutionary movements, a government can actually arm itself against them. With this knowledge the government should be able to devise ways to contain or disperse the energy of a revolution and rechannel that energy into path-ways more acceptable to the government.

At the end of World War II, the United States was the most powerful nation in the world, with a flexible response capability and diverse limited war capabilities. The counterforce puissance of the United States, and the American resolve to halt the spread of Communism, culminated in the drafting of NSC 68 which obligated the United States to combat Communist

aggression worldwide. In the years that followed the NSC 68 call to action, Communist aggression has been vaguely defined as almost anything the Soviet Union supports. Foreign government leaders were quick to discover that the inclusion of the words "anti-Communist" in any request for aid from the United States was sure to increase their chances of securing that aid. And, spreading the anti-Communist gospel, the United States became involved in bi- and multilateral treaties worldwide to contain the spread of Communism. As the active partner in these treaties, the United States spent billions of dollars in the name of anti-Communism. This massive expenditure proved particularly effective in areas where American national power was brought easily to bear. Our enormous airlift capability suggested our successful intervention in the 1946-48 Berlin Blockade crisis. The 1950-53 Korean War allowed us to use troops and World War II equipment to best advantage; our massive financial empire and technological advantage created the ICBM and submarine ballistic missile forces that later forced the Soviet Union to back down in the 1962 Cuban Missile crisis. The United States has been ineffective largely in those instances where the enemy refused to meet us openly on the battlefield. In Vietnam we defeated the enemy on the battlefield time after time, but ultimately we lost the war.[1] We lost that war because the enemy was bringing to us a war that we did not understand. Although more properly classified as a civil war, the Vietnamese conflict began as a revolutionary movement.[2]

There have been many successful Marxist-Leninst revolutions since World War II. China, Cuba, Nicaragua, and many others are examples of Marxist-Leninist revolutions that the United States, and the governments it supported, were unable to subdue. If the United States is serious about containing Communism, it must first be able to recognize its enemy in every form. Implicit in this thesis is the recognition and certainty that Marxist-Leninist revolutions are prey to inherent weaknesses that can be exploited by both the United States and its client governments. By studying Marxist-Leninist theory and the revolutions it has inspired, it should be possible to discern flaws in the overall structure of revolutionary movements. That is the thrust of this thesis. .

CHAPTER I
END NOTES

1. Summers Jr., On Strategy, p. 1.
2. Canh, N., Vietnam Under Communism, 1975-1982, pp. 6-7.

II. REVOLUTIONS AND TYRANNY

"There is no subjugation so perfect as that which keeps the appearance of freedom, because in that way one captures volition itself." Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

In the civilized world, the concept of true freedom does not exist; for civilization implies codes and laws, and laws imply constraints on behavior.[1] If constraints on behavior deny true freedom, then freedom is a misnomer, an illusion that cannot be attained. Yet freedom was incorporated into every revolutionary movement that ever flourished. Historically, one man's freedom has often been another man's chains. Societies have evolved social norms that their members are expected to follow.[2] By conforming to these norms, the members of a society have, in effect, relinquished their personal freedoms and subjugated these freedoms to a higher law. In that sense, freedom is interpreted as that degree of comfort experienced by an individual within his social class. When the limits imposed by a society on its individuals are perceived to be too strict, or too confining, then individual freedom is perceived as having been lost. When this perception is widely shared, the individual senses a discomfort with the system and will attempt to change his condition. Within the same system, if enough individuals feel discomfort a collective will is developed which nurtures the seeds of future revolutions. These revolutionary seeds carry within them social norms that are acceptable to the discomfitted individuals. These new social

norms, imposed by a successful revolution, become the new chains that bind individuals in the new society. Continuing this logic, revolutions are manifestations of normative behavior and their nature is cyclic. If this is true, then attempting to prevent revolutions would be futile. However, inherent in the concept of civilization is the belief that laws are above man and that these laws should shape and govern man's actions. The formulation and enforcement of these laws requires a central authority capable of carrying out the will of the greater society. This central authority has come to be called government, and governments have been either legitimate or illegitimate depending on the perceptions of the society they represented.

A legitimate government has the support of the majority of the people whom it represents. As long as people perceive their government representing their best interests, that government will remain in power. However, when the majority of the people perceive their government misrepresenting them, then that government becomes illegitimate. The more illegitimate a government, the greater force and coercion it must use to remain in power. Hence, an illegitimate government cannot remain in power unless it has the power to force itself upon the people. Ironically, the illegitimacy that spawns the use of force to subjugate the people to its will creates even greater illegitimacy. Theoretically, there is a limit to how great that power can become before the government is unable to support it.

While the illegitimate government appears to enjoy every advantage with its growing force, in reality that force proves to be a major disadvantage. It is usually comprised of military arms and manpower which are not inexpensive and must be supported financially by the very people whom these arms and personnel are subjugating.[3] An added taxation on the people's resources creates a number of disadvantages for a government: (1) it increases the distance between the classes of a given society; the haves and the have-nots, (2) it lowers the standard of living of the masses and makes their existence harder to achieve with each passing day, and (3) it increases the discontent experienced by the masses at any particular time. Another major disadvantage of maintaining a large force of men under arms is that these men are drawn from the populace. They are trained in the skills of war and population control, and when they return to their homes a growing wealth of military knowledge is transferred to the populace.[4] The third major disadvantage a government faces when it allows its force to grow too big is that eventually it becomes financially unmanageable. At this point the government has no recourse but to seek outside aid to maintain its present and future expected increased force levels. By seeking outside aid the government dilutes its autonomy within the international system and/or mortgages its financial future. The above conditions indicate that increased force levels may not be advantageous for a government that is trying to control its populace. Therefore,

movement was different from any of the revolutionary movements so far discussed. In 1923, the PKI (Asia's first Communist party) was founded by a group of Dutch radicals[28] who, within six years, had organized to where armed revolt commenced against Dutch colonialism. The revolution was badly organized, and most of the participants had little conception of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. These Communists were ill prepared, ill armed, misled and misused by the Communist hard core of the PKI. On November 13, 1926 revolt broke out against the Dutch colonial government. In the early morning hours the Communist party seized the telephone and telegraph building in Batavia. By dawn the Dutch army had retaken the strong point and, by November 19, had defeated the revolution. The main reason for its defeat was that the masses failed to respond to the Communist summons to rise and revolt.[29] During the 1930s and through World War II the PKI aligned itself with the Dutch in its fight against world fascism. However, in 1947 the PKI returned to the far left. After World War II, the Dutch attempted to reestablish their control of Indonesia. Fighting ensued between the Dutch and the Indonesian army and, on September 18, 1948 while the Indonesian army was fighting the Dutch, the PKI staged a coup at Madiun in East Java. The Indonesian Army found itself trapped between the Dutch on one front and the Communists on the other. To the Indonesian army this was a stab in the back which its army general staff never

forgot, and they crushed the Communist revolt. The Communists admitted that the most important factor in their defeat was the lack of support by the people.[30] Secondly, the Communists admitted another mistake - the killings and atrocities committed against adversaries within the areas they controlled. From 1948 through the 1950s the Communist party in Indonesia gained increasing popular support. President Sukarno was forced to recognize the Communist Party and, in the international milieu, he was perceived as having leftist inclinations.

On December 29, 1964 Malaya was elected to a one-year term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations. Sukarno reacted by withdrawing Indonesia's membership in the U.N.[31] During 1965, harassment of the United States government and business personnel reached new heights. On March 19, the government nationalized American owned oil companies and Royal Dutch Shell Oil. During the following weeks other American concerns were nationalized in Indonesia. Even the Peace Corps was pressured into leaving.[32] By 1964, the consumer price index was twenty-five times as high as it had been in 1959. No salaried employee, military or civilian, could subsist on his pay alone after 1962.[33] On August 17, 1965, President Sukarno addressed an Indonesian Independence Day gathering and remarked that he could not live forever and did not know who would succeed him as leader of the country.

On September 30, an abortive coup was launched by the PKI and this proved disastrous for the Communist movement in Indonesia. Rebel forces seized the radio station the next day and announced that they had formed a revolutionary council and cabinet. Within a day, General Suharto, commander of the army strategic reserve, recaptured the radio station. In the next two days, disclosures that the coup conspirators had murdered six generals on the night of September 30 and critically wounded one general's five year old daughter, turned popular opinion against the Communists.[34] By December anti-Communist mobs were engaged in mass executions of Communists and Communist sympathizers. Observers estimated that over 200,000 people were killed during this malevolent period.[35] Apparently, Sukarno had given tacit support to the PKI bid for power and, for this, within six months of the coup Sukarno was deprived of effective control of the government.[36] Indonesia created a new anti-Communist leadership headed by acting president General Suharto.

Nicaragua is the largest nation in Central America but one of the least populated. It gained its independence in 1838 but since 1900 U.S. Marines have twice occupied Nicaragua, the last time from 1926 to 1933, to restore order following civil strife. At the end of 1933, the Marines were replaced by the newly created Nicaraguan National Guard headed by General Anastasio Somoza Garcia. Within two years General Somoza had acquired control of the country.[37] General Somoza is reputed to have ordered the execution of a rural patriot named Augusto

Cesar Sandino, who had fought both the U.S. Marines and the National Guard. Using the National Guard as a power base, General Somoza created a family dynasty that was to rule for the next forty-three years. On February 2, 1947 Leonardo Arguello was elected president to succeed Somoza. General Somoza supported Arguello as a possible figurehead but when the new president proved independent he was removed. On March 25, 1950 General Somoza reassumed the presidency. An opposition group with Marxist leanings was organized and claimed the name Sandinista, from the dead patriot.[38] On September 29, 1956 President Somoza died of gunshot wounds, and his son, Luis, was unanimously elected to serve until May, 1957, and then was reelected for a six-year term. In February 1967 General Anastasio Somoza Debayle was elected president, assuring the dominance of the Somoza dynasty. Until well into the 1970s the Sandinista guerrillas carried out many spectacular raids throughout the country. Although these raids publicized the Sandinista movement, it lacked popular support. In 1977, Somoza Debayle declared that "the Sandinistas are finished - divided and conquered by me."[39]

In 1978, the assassination of Pedro Joaquin Chamorro Cardenal, the editor and publisher of the opposition La Prensa, galvanized popular support for the Sandinista movement. Joined by an increasing number of middle class scholars and professionals, the Sandinistas benefited from a nationwide disenchantment with the Somoza regime. In 1978 an unsuccessful

coup attempt against the government of Somoza was successfully quelled by the government. In 1979 the Sandinista movement announced the final push against Somoza and by late 1979 General Somoza's government had been toppled.[40] The Sandinista government discovered that the national treasury had no more than three million dollars and that the government owed 1.6 billion to the international monetary system. Nicaragua had been milked by the Somoza dynasty and its people, long-suffering from poverty and illiteracy, were victims of a corrupt regime.

In all countries where Marxist revolutions have occurred the governments have been either colonial governments, occupation governments, family ruled governments, or military governments. From the people's perspective, all these governments were, in effect, occupation governments and the governmental forces that sustained these governments were occupation forces in the people's eyes. These governments had the military, the financial backing, and the international support to quell revolutionary movements, but ultimately none of these governments was successful. In all the countries enduring Marxist revolutions, poverty was widespread and people's rights had been oppressed for many years. In these fertile conditions, the Marxist revolutionary movements galvanized popular support. One singular fact that emerges is all ultimately successful Marxist insurgencies had experienced failure before eventually attaining success.

B. THE HEAD (LEADERS)

Lenin stated that, "to be successful, insurrection must rely not upon conspiracy and not upon a party, but upon the advanced class."[41] This grain of truth is the basis of all revolutions. It is not the peasant masses that control a revolution; it is the ruling elite that controls a revolution, in opposition to another ruling elite.[42] This thesis distinguishes between the masses of a country and its elite. The masses, the peasants, are widely separated in social status from the intellectuals, governmental politicians, the bureaucracy and the professionals.

Lenin's mother was a physician's daughter, his father a respected administrator of the provincial school district, and a member of the minor Russian nobility.[43] Mao Tse-Tung was university-educated, the son of a prosperous middle class peasant family in Hunan Province where the penetration of western missionary and economic influence was strong.[44] Ho Chi Minh derived from the French-educated intelligencia;[45] Vo Nguyen Giap from the same source and with the highest academic degree available in French Indochina, a doctorate in law.[46] The father of Fidel and Raul Castro was a rich plantation farmer and a member of Cuba's upper class. Fidel graduated from the University of Havana and practiced law before 1953.[47] Che Guevara was a medical doctor, son of an Argentine architect.[48] The leadership of Malaya's Communist insurgency after World War II was drawn almost exclusively from the ranks

of the intellectuals and urban professionals.[49] The Communist movements in the Philippines and Indonesia were both characterized by leadership that derived its origins from the upper class. Tomas Borge Martinez, sole surviving founder of the Sandinista movement, identified with the intellectual class. Jaime Wheelock, another influential Sandinista leader, also had a wide educational background.[50] It is interesting that, Magasaysay, who was given credit for defeating the Philipine Communist insurgency, was from the agrarian masses, not the ruling elite.

It is evident that the actual leaders of Marxist inspired revolutions are not of the people. These elite who inspire Marxist revolutions are almost identical to the elite who are overthrown. If, in countries where Marxist revolutions have been successful, the peasantry is characterized as illiterate and their existence slave-like, then one could logically assume that the only people who would understand new ideas from without - and have the time to experiment with implementing these new ideas - would be members of the upper class who had been afforded educational opportunities and exposed to the international system.

An aspect that recurs in Marxist revolutions is that many of the leaders were at one time incarcerated by the very regime they later overthrew. Lenin was imprisoned under the Tsarist Regime, released and exiled. Fidel Castro was sentenced to prison by Batista in Cuba. Many prominent members of the

Indonesian Communist movement, the North Vietnamese Communist movement and the Sandinista Communist movement also languished in prison. This implies that the governments that once had restrained the revolutionaries (who would later claim success) were unable to identify and recognize the severity of the threats.

C. THE CIRCULATION (THE GEOGRAPHY)

Many authors on revolution have noted that geography plays a key role in the success of a revolution.[51] Geographical sanctuaries are developed by a revolutionary movement which provides the foundation of future successes. In these remote sanctuaries, the revolutionary movements develop a strong administrative government and supply system that enable them to continue their fight against the occupying government. Hidden in remote areas, the revolutionary movements are relatively safe from governmental attack. From these bases the revolutionary movements spread their tentacles among the population and effect increasing control of the countryside. The necessity for geographical isolation and the role of sanctuary has been postulated for such countries as Nicaragua, Cuba, North Vietnam, China, and Malaya. Logically, one would not expect to find revolutionary movements in countries where the land is relatively flat, or where there are no sanctuaries within the country, or neighboring countries. This is not the case. In the American Revolution there were major pitched battles on open countryside and, while guerrilla movements were

successful in forests, major battles were won on the open battlefield. Lawrence of Arabia led a revolution against colonial rule in relatively flat terrain. The Russian Revolution occurred mainly in major urban areas. The Chinese Communist revolutionary movement was driven from its sanctuaries and had to undertake the "long march". These revolutionary movements were successful without remote geographical sanctuaries, which indicates that they are not important foundations of revolution. It indicates something significantly different. Perhaps it is not the isolation of the revolutionary movement from the government forces that is important, but the government's isolation from the people that is significant.

If a government is perceived as illegitimate in the eyes of the people, then it has effectively isolated itself from the very people it seeks to control. If the government has isolated itself from the people, then the revolutionary movement, as it gains legitimacy in the eyes of the people, is able to move through the people at will without interference from government or from the population. This ability to move through the people is the sanctuary of a revolutionary movement. The guerrilla who works by day and attacks by night is effectively hidden in the very bowels of the government itself. Both Mao Tse-Tung and Ho Chi Minh commented on this ability to move through the people as one of the greatest assets of a revolution.[52] If sanctuary is created by the

government's isolation from the people, this indicates that any site in the country could become an acceptable point of entry for arms smuggling and any place in the country could serve as a base of operations for the revolutionary group. The best examples today are the opposition movements in Afghanistan, and the accompanying arms smuggling; and the opposition group and arms smuggling in El Salvador. Theoretically, there is a time when the growth of the revolutionary army limits its mobility. At that point, geographical sanctuary gains importance.

While the illegitimacy of a government appears to be a major factor, two other factors must be considered; lines of communication and transportation. Communication is defined as two-way communication -- from the people to the government and back -- through credible channels. Transportation is defined as that mobility available to people throughout the country. It may be supplied through systems of roadways, railways, air transportation, or other means.

The best recent example of the communication concept is the British experience in Malaya against Communist insurgency forces. When the British were requested to assist the Malaysian government, they took over the government organization and allowed it to free its personnel for the army in the field. At the same time, the British government created a police force that was organized, supported, and manned by the people. It was to report on abuses, by the army, of the civilian population, and locate insurgency groups for the

government. Because of this two-way function the police force became a credible avenue of communication between the people and the government.[53]

When the successful strategic hamlet concept was developed in Malaya, this rural police force became an integral part of it. As strategic hamlets were developed, police forces and people from the locale were a part of each. They became part of a cohesive network of strongholds throughout the country.

In South Vietnam, the strategic hamlet concept failed to achieve the British success.[54] Reasons for this failure were advanced by many authors, but the principal reason they failed was the lack of a viable two-way communication link between the people and the government. In Vietnam the armed forces, the police forces, and the intelligence forces, were government controlled and the people could not identify with them. The forces were in the countryside not to protect the people but to protect the government. When the strategic hamlet concept was instituted, instead of forming a cohesive network of strongholds throughout the country the strategic hamlets became individual strongholds under seige by Communist insurgency forces.[55]

In the Philippines, Magsaysay listened to the demands of the people in the rural areas and responded to their demands by instituting the reforms they required. In the people's eyes, this was a credible two-way link between the people and the government. The Communist insurgency in the Philippines failed

because the government heard the people and instituted the reforms that they desired. Two-way communications are a must for a government to stay in power.

Military commanders recognize the importance of lines of transportation, for resupply of troops in the forward battle areas and for transportation to and beyond the forward battle areas. Many political leaders do not grasp the importance of transportation lines. In the countries discussed thus far, all the transportation lines connected major urban areas and effectively bypassed rural areas. This isolated the rural from the urban people, and isolated them from the government. Because the transportation lines were not developed, it was difficult for the government to maintain a presence in areas where the Communist insurgency was growing. This presence, so necessary for successful governmental action against an insurgency, can be maintained only if transportation is developed from the urban areas to the rural areas. Without transportation lines already in place, the geographical sanctuary provided late stage guerrilla movements, when they reach a size where mobility is limited, is available in the countryside.

Illegitimate governments, in effect, isolate themselves from the people -- creating the very sanctuary that the revolutionary movement requires to achieve success. Lines of communication and lines of transportation can effectively reduce these sanctuary areas within a country by spreading the

government's influence. The reduction of sanctuary areas permits the government to focus its energy on several small areas rather than one huge area, increasing its effectiveness against the insurgency. Use of government forces to build these roads and these lines of communications is often perceived by the people as active government interest in the livelihood and concerns of the deep rural areas.

D. THE TRANSFUSION (EXTERNAL SUPPORT)

Some writers in revolutionary theory have identified external support as a requirement for a revolution to succeed. They cite such revolutions as the American revolution, the Chinese Communist revolution, the South Vietnamese revolution, and more recently, revolutions in Nicaragua and El Salvador. They aver that without external support a revolutionary movement cannot be successful, and they cite the Philippines, Greece, and the Malay Peninsula.[56] In the Malay Peninsula, British authorities effectively isolated the Communist insurgency forces from outside aid before destroying them. In the Philippines, geographical isolation was the downfall of the Communist insurgency movement, while in Greece the geographical isolation of Greece, caused by Yugoslav withdrawal of aid and support for the Communist insurgency, led to the downfall of that revolutionary movement. However, a review of the data supporting the Communist revolutionary movements noted in this thesis indicates that external support is not a requirement and, sometimes, is not a factor. In the Russian revolution, it

was not external support that won the revolution for the Soviet workers; rather, it was the army's transfer of loyalty to the revolutionary side.[57] In Cuba, Fidel Castro received almost no external support until after he had achieved a successful revolution. At this point he negotiated with the Soviet Union for massive arms shipments.[58] In Nicaragua, the Sandinista revolutionary movement received almost no external support until after they had successfully seized the country. Then, the Soviet Union, through Cuba, started supplying the arms that made Nicaragua the power it is in Central America.[59] In the Philippines and the Malay Peninsula, it was not the insurgency's inability to get external support that led to their downfall. It was the inability of the Communist revolutionary movement to gain popular support.

In other than Marxist inspired revolutionary movements external support does not always constitute a factor. The French revolution, the English revolution and, most recently, the revolution in Iran against the Shah, all indicate that the internal will of the people dictated the results. It may be concluded that external aid is of minor importance to a successful revolution.

E. THE ANTIBODIES (THE ARMY)

Ideally, the armed forces of a government are designed to defend it against external aggression. Realistically, both legitimate and illegitimate governments recognize that these same forces can be used to enforce their will upon the people.

If the armed forces are unwavering in their loyalty to the government and, if they are strong enough, then the government's will can be imposed on the people. The most dangerous moment for a government occurs when either its military forces are no longer strong enough to defeat the insurrectionist forces within the country, or their loyalty wavers. No one enjoys losing, and military forces are no different. Historically, when military forces perceived that "the correlation of forces" has turned to the people, they have first wavered, then often sided with the people. Lenin identifies this wavering of the armed forces as a primary factor in a successful revolution.[60] In the Soviet October 17 revolution, the armed forces of the Tsar wavered, and many divisions sided with the populace.

Outside of Marxist revolutions, the Shah of Iran and his military forces were ample to keep the population under control. It was when the army wavered that the Shah's power was lost. In examining colonial or occupation forces, it is that point at which those forces perceive it is no longer in their interest to remain that exemplifies the change. When a colonial government withdraws, a power vacuum is created. Into that power vacuum the strongest force moves, i.e., the revolutionary force.

Specifically in Marxist revolutions, it is important that the wavering of the armed forces that carry a revolutionary movement to power is often fatal for the military commanders of

those forces. After every successful Marxist revolution, military leaders have either been purged or imprisoned, and many intelligence representatives eliminated. Hence, in the context of a Marxist revolution, it is unhealthy for the armed forces of a country to waver toward a Communist insurgency. Clearly, they should support the government, whether it be legitimate or illegitimate.

F. THE DNA (THE STRUCTURE)

Almost all authors in the field of revolutions agree that one of the major strengths of a Communist revolution is its organizational structure. Evidence indicates that the structure of a Communist movement is more organized than the government that it seeks to replace.[61] It is this organizational structure that is so difficult for an illegitimate government to combat, since it is less well organized. One of the major factors in the British success in Malaya was that they assumed the organization of the Malaysian government while it fought the insurgency. This smooth flowing organization, rigidly controlled by the British, allowed the government to utilize effectively its logistic support, material supply, and armed forces.

In successful Marxist revolutions, the country was characterized by a government supported by a large fumbling bureaucracy. This fumbling bureaucracy, hobbled by red tape, bribery and corruption, led to a government incapable of managing its material, logistic or arms supplies. This denied

support to military commanders in the field, making military and political decisions on a day-to-day basis by themselves or, even worse, coping with decisions by leaders at the apex who lacked information on events in the field. This inefficient bureaucracy has two adverse effects: It increases the isolation of the government from the people, since they cannot attain what they desire through the government. And, each layer of ineptitude, each layer of corruption and bribery, and each layer of incompetence, has a multiplicative effect on the overall weakness of the government. If these effects are not reversed, if the bumbling bureaucracy is not reorganized, and if the corruption and bribery is not abated, then the government becomes so weakened that it cannot defend against an adversary from within. These governments become easy targets for the Marxist revolutionary because of his organization, his identification with the people, and his perception within the country as a legitimate force. This strengthens the image of the Marxist revolutionary who is strongly organized and legitimate, against a government that is illegitimate, disorganized and incompetent. One of the best defenses against Marxist revolution is a government with excellent organizational foundations.

G. THE SHOCK TREATMENT (GUERRILLA WARFARE AND TERRORISM)

Terrorism and guerrilla warfare have two things in common: They are both used by a smaller, weaker force against a larger and stronger force, and their purpose is to provide the

image of an impotent enemy. Revolutionary movements, because they are small, and because they are initially weak, use terrorism and guerrilla warfare to their great advantage. The role of terrorism by Marxist revolutionaries in the opening stages of revolution is well documented. During the Sandinista revolution many kidnappings, bank robberies, and assassinations of public officials took place, while in Cuba public officials were targets of open warfare. In South Vietnam and in China numerous public officials were assassinated or cowed by Marxist revolutionaries. This demoralized the government forces as well as the people. For, if the government could not protect itself, how could it hope to protect the people? As usual, the people are very perceptive on such matters. Government leaders, to protect the government itself, must institute ever more repressive measures against the people. They, of course, are the innocent victims and the greater the repression the greater the resentment against the government in power. Acts of terror also draw international attention to developments within the country, and this international attention can oftimes develop external support for the revolutionary movement. Acts of terrorism are difficult for a government to counteract because of their unpredictability and the unknown individuals involved. Often terror is a two-edged sword. For instance, when a kidnapping has taken place and ransom money is demanded, this ransom usually supports the revolutionary

movement with arms and logistics. So a government is hurt twice by any act of terrorism.

Because guerrilla warfare is used by a weaker force attacking a stronger force, it has been used in every communist insurrection. Guerrilla forces may strike at the heart of the government, any time, any place, anywhere, with seeming impunity. The government, not knowing where the next attack is aimed, must spread its forces thinly. This thinning of government forces makes them more susceptible to guerrilla attacks, which become more effective. Thus the cycle is formed and becomes vicious. As the guerrilla movement becomes more successful, the government finds itself under seige. Its forces can move between large cities and forts only with large mechanized support forces. The state of seige isolates the government from the rural countryside, and Marxist revolutionary movements use this isolation to broaden their power base through the countryside.

An insidious aspect of both guerrilla warfare and terrorism is that they feed upon the government itself. Terrorism, through extortion, gains money for the revolutionary movement. It cows the people and makes them more tractable to the Marxist revolutionaries. It renders the government impotent in the eyes of the people. Guerrilla warfare is often characterized by an army working by day and striking by night. This army, working within the government, is drawing financial support from the government it is fighting.

CHAPTER IV
END NOTES

1. Arendt, H., On Revolution, p. 63.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Pomeroy, W., Guerrilla Warfare & Marxism, pp. 84-94.
5. Ibid., p. 108.
6. Ibid., pp. 107-09.
7. Gaddis, J., Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretative History, p. 12.
8. Ibid., p. 13.
9. Langer, W., An Encyclopedia of World History, p. 1029.
10. Clubb, E., 20th Century China, p. 137.
11. Ibid., p. 185.
12. Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, pp. 213-49.
13. Clubb, E., op. cit., pp. 198-202.
14. Ibid., p. 216.
15. Clutterbuck, R., Guerrillas and Terrorists, pp. 34-35.
16. Ibid.,
17. Ibid., p. 36.
18. Chaffee, P., and others, Area Handbook for the Philippines, pp. 43-44.
19. Clutterbuck, R., op. cit., pp. 37-38.
20. Ibid.
21. Langer, W., op. cit., p. 1210.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.

24. Clutterbuck, R., op. cit., p. 96.

25. Langer, W., op. cit., p. 1072.

26. Ibid., p. 1246.

27. Ibid., p. 1255.

28. Brackman, A., The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, p. 24.

29. Ibid., p. 25.

30. Ibid., p. 26.

31. Vreeland, N. and others, Area Handbook for Indonesia, p. 54.

32. Ibid., p. 55.

33. Ibid., p. 56.

34. Brackman, A., op. cit., pp. 74-84.

35. Ibid., p. 114.

36. Ibid., pp. 85-95.

37. Wesson, R., Communism in Central America and the Caribbean, p. 53.

38. Ibid.

39. Ibid.

40. Ibid.

41. Pomeroy, W., op. cit., p. 110.

42. Greene, T., Comparative Revolutionary Movements, p. 16.

43. Ibid., p. 17.

44. Ibid., p. 23.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. Wesson, R., op. cit., p. 56.

51. Greene, T., op. cit., pp. 120-122.
Clutterbuck, R., op. cit., p. 38.

52. Greene, T., Comparative Revolutionary Movements, p. 25, 36.

53. Clutterbuck, R., op. cit., p. 42.

54. Ibid., p. 47.

55. Ibid., p. 45.

56. Greene, op. cit., pp. 120-22.

57. Pomeroy, W., op. cit., pp. 73-77.

58. Wesson, R. and others, op. cit., p. 35.

59. Ibid., pp. 41-42.

60. Pomeroy, W., op. cit., p. 80.

61. Greene, T., op. cit., pp. 64-69.

V. THE DEFENSE

A. THE FOUNDATION.

Any government supported by the people is legitimate, and any insurrection against this government will be viewed by them as a cancer that must be destroyed. A government which does not enjoy the support of the people loses its legitimacy and any insurrection against this government gains legitimacy by its very opposition. So, it is necessary for any government, legitimate or otherwise, to maintain the facade of legitimacy in the eyes of the people. The foundations of this facade are the government's organizational structure, and the lines of communication and transportation throughout the countryside.

1. Organization

A strong organizational structure enhances a government's capabilities for leadership. It also intensifies a government's capability to react to internal stimuli. A swift reaction to internal stimuli implies more effective control of the populace by the government, and enhances the stability of the government in the eyes of the people, reinforcing its legitimacy. A second benefit of a well organized government is that the people can interact with it on a real time basis and this interaction heightens their perception of a responsive government. The strength of a communist revolutionary movement is that it is better organized than the government it replaces. Therefore, one may conclude that a well organized, responsive

governmental structure is the foundation of any successful defense against communist insurgency.

2. Transportation

Military leaders must be able to move government forces to isolated areas within the country. For this, lines of transportation are critical to a government's survival.[1] A viable network of lines of transportation throughout a country not only enhances the mobility of the army but encourages that of the people as well. The enhanced mobility increases the potential for economic interaction between communities. An increased potential for economic interaction between communities, if effectively utilized, promotes an increase in the standard of living among the people.[2] The better standard of living will be attributed to the government and thus enhance its legitimacy. The major advantage of effective lines of transportation throughout a country is that a responsive, well organized governmental structure spreads its influence throughout and is perceived by the people as part of their daily lives.

3. Communication

Equally important are effective two-way communications throughout a country. People view their government's capability to communicate effectively as of paramount importance in augmenting its stability and legitimacy. It is not required that people can communicate with this government,

only that the people perceive that the two-way communication exists. A police force staffed by indigenes would intensify the perception of two-way communications between people and government, stabilizing the legitimacy of that government.[3] This police network, a secondary network of the government, increases its intelligence gathering capabilities.[4] With better intelligence, the government can respond effectively to internal crises. The population's identification with the police only increases the government's capabilities.

4. Visibility

To perpetuate the facade of legitimacy, the government must maintain visibility among the people. It must be positive and must identify with the people. Use of government forces to build public works projects, construct transportation lines, and increase communications capabilities throughout the country enhances the government's prestige, and thus its legitimacy in the eyes of the people. Using the armed forces in this manner diffuses the organizational capability of the government. The government should also initiate an organization similar to the Peace Corps, with which the people can immediately identify and perceive as having beneficial effects for the country. The government and this Peace Corps should be charged with bringing low cost technology to the rural areas to upgrade the standard of living. "Back to the land" publications, popularized in the United States, should be available to the people.

5. Special Police and Intelligence Forces

While government forces should strive to maintain high positive visibility, special police forces and intelligence organizations should conversely maintain low visibility among the people. Interrogations and incarcerations should receive the absolute minimum of publicity. These forces should not be readily identifiable by the public from uniforms, insignia or any other trademarks. Apprehensions and arrests should be effected with minimum public disturbance.

6. The News Media

An illegitimate government has more to gain by manipulation of the news media than by stifling it. The news media should maintain the appearance of a public forum, working in the interests of the people. This reputation established, the government can publicize its efforts on behalf of the nation, thus increasing its visibility.

If an increase in positive visibility is beneficial to the government, then greater negative visibility of the opposition is also beneficial. News media journalists should accompany government forces when they deal with acts of terrorism and extreme guerrilla warfare. The destruction and carnage wreaked by these insurrectionists can be portrayed as acts against the people, not acts against the government. Concurrently, the news media should be encouraged to publicize the positive visibility aspects of the government.

Once the foregoing is achieved, the government should not limit the news media to urban phenomena. It should encourage the spread of the news media and local distsribution centers should be established in every community. The government should consider subsidizing the news network initially until a solidly entrenched, viable news media is active. This will increase the visibility of the government by providing another two-way communication channel; not from the people to the government, or from the government to the people, but from both to the majority.

B. THE WAR

Any government facing an insurgency, should recognize that it is at war. Once war is declared the government must mobilize every capability at its command to insure it achieves victory. A specific, coherent response by the government to the threat presented by insurgencies must be developed.

1. Terrorism

The dual role of terrorism in insurgency is to increase the image of government impotency in the national view, and to subsidize the revolutionary movement. To be effective, terrorism must be perceived by the people as acts against the government. For the government to be effective it must subvert the purpose of these terrorist acts and redirect them at the people. Thereafter, terrorist acts will be perceived by the people as acts against them, not against the

government. The news media can play an instrumental role in providing this perception to the people. Concerted action by the governmental structure and the news media can galvanize the opposition of the people through revulsion against senseless violence. If terrorism can be portrayed as acts against the people, and if a specific organization can be identified as responsible, then the people have a target upon which to vent their hostility. This hostility toward the terrorist group protects not only the people but serves the secondary purpose of protecting the government in power.

To achieve this capability requires a highly organized government structure, with positive visibility in the national view, utilizing an entrenched news media to galvanize public support. The role of intelligence, not only of the special police but also of the two-way communications links, can facilitate this.

2. Guerrilla Warfare

No guerrilla warfare can succeed without at least tacit support from the people. A guerrilla movement gains strength from its ability to move through the people and operate in the bowels of government. This can occur only if the government is perceived as illegitimate. Therefore, in its war against guerrillas, the government must recognize that its thrust must be to convince the people that the guerrilla movement is illegitimate. Once accomplished, the people become the

greatest protectors of the government. Guerrilla warfare is not won on the battlefields but in the minds of the people,[5] and if popular will can be galvanized, as it was in Indonesia against the Communists, then the guerrilla movement will lack sanctuary and be ineffective.

3. External Support

We have established that external support is not a prerequisite to successful revolution. However, external support can be an annoyance to the government. Once the dynamism of the people is directed against the revolutionary movement, external support has no secure avenues to enter the country. The two-way communications links, so vital to a government, allows intelligence to filter from the populace to the government, revealing the location of entry points for illegal weapons and support.[6] With this information government can close these avenues.

4. Elimination of Opposition

Once a government recognizes that an insurgency is a war, captured insurgents become prisoners of war. Evidence from previous Communist insurgencies indicates that released insurgent prisoners oftimes destroy the government that released them. Understanding this, the government should attempt to destroy the opposition when it can. The Soviet Union and the North Vietnamese have gained some success with their "re-education camps" (concentration camps).[7] Through

these camps, both countries have effectively neutralized all opposition by placing this internal threat where the only viable release is death. These Communist nations have achieved this surreptitiously because of their complete control over the news media. This thesis indicated that news media control is not in a government's best interest. However, if the will of the people is galvanized into an anti-revolutionary fervor, and if the visibility of these "re-education camps" is low, then tacit approval of the population might be forthcoming.

The leadership of communist insurrections has been identified as elitist, while the soldiers of a revolution come from the people.[8] Execution of captured insurgent leaders removes any future threat. Conversely, the government should recognize that soldiers of the revolution are from the people and different methods should be employed to control them. In Malaya and the Philippines, captured insurgents were treated fairly by the government and later released. This had a positive effect on the legitimate image portrayed by the government and a negative effect on the legitimacy of the revolutionary movement.

5. Shock Tactics

The government should maximize its strength by subtle manipulation of the emotional will of the people. In Indonesia, publicizing the death of five generals and the critical wounding of one five-year old girl galvanized the

country into an anti-Communist fervor. The ensuing slaughter of Communists, insured the government's power for years to come. A government at war with an insurgent group should recognize that any atrocity, any bloodshed, can be used to stir the people into anti-Communist fervor. The government should publicize these acts when they occur and encourage the news media to intensify their bloodthirsty aspects. This increases the illegitimacy of the Marxist movement.

6. The Marxist Leadership

The leadership of a Marxist movement comes from the elite and not from the people. Government should recognize this weakness and exploit it at every opportunity. The people should be aware that they are being manipulated by elitists. They should be educated in the more brutal aspects of a successful Communist revolution. The purges, the concentration camps, and the elimination of the military officer corps should be publicized. In countries where religion plays a major role, propaganda should emphasize the anti-religious nature of Communist movements.[9] Through these methods, the Marxist leadership loses credibility and thus legitimacy, in the eyes of its followers and the indigenous population.

7. Propaganda

While propaganda enhances government control of a nation, it should be perceived as the truth in the eyes of the

people. With this goal in mind, government should approach propaganda from the people's perspective. Destruction of businesses, transportation and communications, and power facilities lead to economic disarray, which destabilizes the people's standard of living. These aspects should be publicized and the nation must be aware that every act of violence reduces their standard of living and dilutes their hopes. Properly utilized, propaganda can focus the people's anger on a Marxist insurgency and not against the government, unable to protect the facilities being destroyed.

Since religion and Communism are often antithetical, religious propaganda should be utilized. The powers of good and evil should be invoked with good on the government side and evil portrayed by the Marxist revolutionary. The government should appear peace loving, conservative, and responsive while the Marxist insurgency must be portrayed as bloodthirsty, radical and totalitarian.

8. Discipline of the Troops

Among the foundations of Marxist revolutionary faith is that the people's army is never perceived as mistreating the civilian population.[10] Goods procured are paid for and people are treated with civility and respect. The government should insure that its armed forces reflect this image always. When violations of discipline occur, the people should witness the punishment meted out. While not necessarily enhancing the

army's stature, it enhances the legitimacy of this element of the government.

9. Reforms

If a government can afford to comply with specific demands by the people, reforms should be instituted. These reinforce the two-way communications channel that the people perceive they have with the government. The reforms should not jeopardize the government nor the economic power structure of that country. Agrarian land reforms can be accomplished without threatening major land holders. Economic reforms can be commenced while allowing those wielding economic power to derive benefits from the economy. It is necessary only that the population perceive that the government is attentive to their demands and desires.

CHAPTER V
END NOTES

1. Clutterbuck, R., Guerrillas and Terrorists, p. 34.
2. Greene, T., Comparative Revolutionary Movements, p. 121.
3. Clutterbuck, op. cit., p. 42.
4. Ibid., p. 47.
5. Ibid., p. 25.
6. Ibid., p. 42.
7. Canh, N., Vietnam Under Communism 1975-1982, pp. 188-205. Solzhenitsyn, A., The Gulag Archipelago, Vol. I, II, III.
8. Greene, T., op. cit, p. 34.
9. Ibid., pp. 126-127.
10. Clutterbuck, op. cit., p. 31.

VI. CONCLUSIONS, AND IMPLICATIONS FOR UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

A conclusion of this thesis is that a government that cannot maintain its legitimacy, in the eyes of its population, is doomed. If the people are aroused, and their will is galvanized against a government in power, as it was against the Shah of Iran, then no military force can prevent its downfall. Only a government responsive to the needs of the people, which appears in touch with the people, and maintains a facade of legitimacy (as seen by those people), can hope to remain in power. While specific actions may be undertaken by the government to maintain its power for a time, that government should recognize that its existence feeds on the power and the energy of its people. If the body (the people) does not support the head (the government) then the body is beheaded. It is imperative that policy makers first determine precisely whether the government they intend to support is legitimate or illegitimate.

Under international law, the United States must negotiate with another recognized government. Nowhere in international law theory is it explicitly stated that the United States is obliged to support a government in power. The United States should be sensitive, and recognize that a government is no more than an organized structure representative of its people. When people no longer support that government then it no longer represents the people. If illegitimate governments are doomed,

then our support of illegitimate governments dooms us as well to be always on the losing side. Cries of anti-Americanism, anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, all directed at the United States, have caused disharmony in our relationships with country after country. If the United States is required by its national security objectives to support an illegitimate government then we should seek the most effective way to support that government. An important corollary is that the U.S. resolve to support that government must be strong and convincing. If an illegitimate government requests aid from the United States to fight an insurgency, we should demand control over how that aid is distributed. In South Vietnam, President Diem requested military aid but denied the United States the ability to oversee other aspects of support. The United States should have required access to several levels of the organizational structure of the government. We should have insured that transportation and communication lines were developed and that cohesive communications networks were available for the people. We should have insisted that reform programs be initiated and that participation by the people in their government was institutionalized. In short, we should have dealt with the real power of that nation; the people. We were doomed in South Vietnam, not by our military weakness, but by our inability to recognize where our true interests and strengths lay. Military strength is important on the battlefield but in revolutions the battle is for the minds of

the people. Recognizing this, the United States should generate new tactics to confront an insurgency against an illegitimate government we support.

In the past, the United States has hesitated to take this approach for fear that our interests would not be achieved. When our support has failed, we have been accused not of interfering with the government but of intefering with the government of the people. With alternate, sensitive, responsive modes of contact, anti-Americanism, anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism might be silenced or redirected and the United States could move more freely. Perhaps the United States might view the international system as a nation-to-nation relationship rather than a government-to-government relationship, and thus could more accurately determine the will of the people of a particular nation, and develop its foreign policy accordingly.

The United States is a government of the people, by the people and for the people - and every American believes this in his heart. We must recognize that every government is a government of the people and by the people, if not necessarily for the people. Just as our revolutionary origins helped us evolve into the nation we are, other nations are evolving. Our leaders have tended to view this evolution as a destabilization of the international system, where United States influence was concerned. Perhaps we should recognize that since we cannot halt this evolution of a nation we could support it with resolve and, for a change, be on the winning side.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Alexander Y., Carlton D., and Wilkinson P., Terrorism: Theory and Practice, Westview Press, 1979.

Arendt, H., On Revolution, Penguin Books, 1965.

Billington, J., Fire in the Minds of Man, Basic Books, Inc., 1980.

Brackman, A., The Communist Collapse in Indonesia, W. W. Norton Company, Inc., 1969.

Brinton, C., The Anatomy of Revolution, 1965.

Burns, E., The Marxist Reader, Avenel Books, 1982.

Canh, N., Vietnam Under Communism: 1975-1982, Hoover Institute Press, 1983.

Centre for Strategic and International Studies, Implications of Soviet and Cuban Activities in Africa for U.S. Policy, 1979.

Chaffee, F. and others, Director, Foreign Area Studies of the American University, Area Handbook for the Philippines, Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969.

Clubb, E., 20th Century China, 2nd Ed., Columbia University Press, 1972.

Clutterbuck, R., Guerrillas and Terrorists, Ohio University Press, 1980.

Dallin, A. and Breslauer, G., Political Terror in Communist Systems, Stanford University Press, 1970.

Durant and Durant, The Lessons of History, Simon and Schuster, 1968.

Engels, F., Revolution and Counter-Revolution in Germany, Foreign Language Press, 1977.

Friedland, W., Revolutionary Theory, Allan Held, Osmun Publishers, 1982.

Gaddis, J., Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretative History, John Wiley & Sons, 1978.

Greene, T., Comparative Revolutionary Movements, Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1974.

Hall, E., Beyond Culture, Anchor Press/Doubleday, 1977.

Henkin, L. and others, International Law: Cases and Materials, West Publishing Company, 1980.

Hitler, A., Mein Kampf, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1971. (Orig. 1927 Verlag Frz. Eher Nachf, GMBH)

Langer, W., An Encyclopedia of World History, Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston, 1972.

Laquer, W., The Terrorism Reader, Meridian Books New American Library, 1978.

Linz, J. and Stefan, A., The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

Mao Tse-Tung, Selected Works of Mao Tse-Tung, People's Publishing House Peking, 1972.

Megargee, E. and Hokanson, J., The Dynamics of Aggression, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1970.

Meisel, J., Counter Revolution, Atherton Press, 1966.

Pierre, A., The Global Politics of Arms Sales, Princeton University Press, 1982.

Pomeroy, W., Guerrilla Warfare & Marxism, International Publishers, 1968.

Skinner, B.F., Beyond Freedom & Dignity, Bantam/Vintage, 1972.

Solzhenitsyn, A., The Gulag Archipelago I, II, III, Harper & Row, Publishers, 1973.

Sterling, C., The Terror Network, Berkley Books, 1982.

Stevens, C., The Soviet Union and Black Africa, Holmes & Meier Publishers, Inc., 1976.

Summers Jr., H., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War, Presidio Press, 1982.

Vreeland, N. and others, The Director Foreign Area Studies of the American University, Area Handbook for Indonesia, Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1934.

Watson, P., War on the Mind, Basic Books, Inc. Publishers, 1978.

Wesson, R. and others, Communism in Central America and the Caribbean, Hoover Institution Press, 1982.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

		No. Copies
1.	Defense Technical Information Center Cameron Station Alexandria, Virginia 22314	2
2.	Library, Code 0142 Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	2
3.	Center for Naval Analysis 2000 North Beauregard Street P. O. Box 11280 Alexandria, Virginia 22311	2
4.	Chairman, Code 56 Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	1
5.	Professor Stephen Jurika, Jr., Code 56Jk Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	1
6.	Professor Boyd Huff, Code 56Hf Department of National Security Affairs Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California 93943	1
7.	LT Robert A. Hendricks, USN P.O. Box 245-E Rt. 3 Highland Drive Smithville, Tennessee 37166	3

216383

T
H
c

Thesis
H44321 Hendricks
c.1 Government can mount effective counter-insurgency programs against marxist oriented revolutions.

27 MAR 86
12 NOV 86

31117
31849

216383

Thesis
H44321 Hendricks
c.1 Government can mount effective counter-insurgency programs against marxist oriented revolutions.

thesH44321
Government can mount effective counter-i
3 2768 000 99205 1
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY